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AN ESSAY ON LOCAL CRITIQUEt
JOHN MOON*

INTRODUCTION
I consider myself a fortunate person, one of the rare law students to
have been part of a course similar to an Introduction to Law. It was
unstructured and fun, yet we all learned an enormous amount. The "class"
consisted of bi-weekly discussions that could make the words put to paper
by a theorist leap off the page causing a liberating and agitated clamor
at some times and a quiet and introspective depression at others. We read
and calmly conversed during the tedium of the course. Consequently, my
first idea for a reaction to An Absolutely Positively True Story was to write
a series of micro-phenomenologies with the hope that I could capture
some of these experiences and tell a story that could evoke similar ideas
and energy in others.
It seemed ironic, however, that an apt description of my experiences
could already be found in the otherwise characteristically formal text of
2
a law review,' let alone in a footnote. As a result, I changed the focus
of my project from a description of what went on to a theory of what we
are doing when we take part in, or theorize about, political action such
as the co-teaching of Introduction to Law. I think that the answers that
I came up with have some relevance for any similar project that takes
place on what is ordinarily known as the fringes of an institutional mecht ®1986, John Moon.
*B.A. 1983, Dickinson College; J.D. 1986, The Washington College of Law, The American
University.
My ideas have been particularly influenced by two recently published articles, The Politics of
Reason: Critical Legal Theory and Local Social Thought, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 685 (1985), and The
Groundless Assault: A Wittgensteinian Look at Language, Structuralism, and Critical Legal Theory.
34 AM. U.L. REV. 1231 (1985), the authors of which I would like to thank: Jamie Boyle and Steve
Brainerd. In addition, several of my colleagues were inspiration and help to me. I am especially
grateful to K.C. Worden, Leslie Guinan, and Jamie Boyle for their input and/or generous comments
upon my final draft. The errors are found where their thoughtful criticism was met with my insistence.
Finally, I would like to thank Thomas Sargentich, professor of the seminar on advanced constitutional
law for which this essay was originally drafted. He encouraged me to pursue my idea of a theory
of political action notwithstanding the fact that it paid little, if any, heed to the pronouncements of
one-hundred and five men and one woman concerning a one-hundred and ninety nine year-old
document.
1. Worden, Overshooting the Target: AFeminist Deconstruction ofLegal Education. 34 AM. U.L.
REV. 1141, 1150-51 (1985).
2. Boyle, An Introduction to a Symposium of Critical Legal Studies, 34 AM. U.L. REV. 929, n. I
(1985).
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anism. In taking on a task that was more laborious and unfunny than my
original plans, I wanted to set forth some theories that would be useful
in thinking about, or even defending, this type of action generally. Accordingly, my inquiry involves far more than political activity in the
setting of a law school.3 For the purposes of my essay, I will call this
genre of political action "local critique." As an introduction to the concept, I will define local critique as a political project that exists on the
"fringe" of a pre-established institutional mechanism, emphasizes the
personal experiences of those involved, and challenges existing patterns
of thought.
The purpose of this inquiry, moreover, is to help find partial solutions
to several vexing questions. For instance, once I believe that the justifications for a medium in which political action takes place have been
thoroughly "trashed," 4 how can I advocate "doing any politics" within
that medium whatsoever? Isn't acting through the institutional mechanisms of an elite medium like law school not only hypocritical but actively
bad? Is it possible to conduct political activity in a manner completely
untainted by the medium? And if so, doesn't advocating this sort of
activity amount to nihilism, anarchism, or something like that?
Traditional notions of political action focus on the state and its authoritative pronouncements, seeing most oppression as being an invasion
of a citizen's "rights" by the state. Oppositional and radical theories on
the other hand, generally focus on some other large-scale social mechanism-such as the institution of private property-and portray oppression as resulting from the inherent attributes of this mechanism. Both
types of theory tend to be blind to experiences which do not "fit" within
their framework. The ACLU liberal may find it hard to conceive of the
everyday oppression of the work place, while the Marxist can only understand sexual harassment if it is linked back into a master, economic
theory. Thus, a first source of dissatisfaction with traditional large-scale
notions of politics is their exclusionary tendencies.
The second source of dissatisfaction lies not so much in the exclusionary
tendencies of these ideas as in their claims to objectivity and finality.
Dialectical Marxism and "Wechslerian" neutral principles both promise
to take politics out of our hands and to provide us with an external calculus
that makes our decisions for us. 5 As you may have guessed by now, I do
not think that this is either possible or desirable.
Now the reader can begin to appreciate the irony of my project. The
3. See infra notes 24-29 and accompanying text.
4. The word "trashing" is quickly becoming a term of art in modem legal theory. To trash a
conception (of state, art, reason ... ), is to take that conception seriously on its own terms, reveal
its incoherent nature, and find patterns that help us conceptualize its inconsistencies. See generally
Kelman, Trashing, 36 STAN. L. REv. 293 (1984).
5. One external calculus, and a misleading one at that, is to define local critique in terms of the
Critical Legal Studies (CLS) movement. CLS has clearly had an influence (good or bad) on many
of the participants in this Symposium. It is true that some of those identified with CLS advocate
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same phenomena which made me reject the objective pretensions of largescale social theories such as Dialectical Marxism and Legal Liberalism,
make it impossible to specify, in exact terms, what local critique is. Two
variations of such a definition would set forth the essence or categories
of local political activity. Each manner of definition fails for the same
reason. For a category to be established, the existence of an essence is
required. This is so, because a category necessarily sets up a dichotomy:
something either falls within or outside the category. Once a category is
established, therefore, something is either this or that. As one observer
has noted, however, the notion of a category assumes certain abilities of
reason: "[w]ithout essences (whether of words, personality, or science),
the lines that it must draw between each side of
how can reason justify
6
dichotomies?"
the
The problem with a definition that relies upon essences, and correlatively upon categories, is that reason is not able to derive the objective
essences that can substantiate our subjective drawing of lines. 7 This is
so, because reason does not enable a person to make a sound distinction
between the facts that one observes on the one hand; and norms, truths,
essences, or scientific laws on the other.8 In other words, the relativity
of each of our experiences does not allow for the ascendancy of one
person's rendition of what constitutes "quintessence" or "truth." Over
the years, commentators (legal, literary, artistic, psychological, semiotic,
etc.) have applied this notion to virtually every area of human endeavor,
so that in the words of one commentator: "[t]he corrosive skepticism of
the modernist era, the breakdown of our metaphysical foundations, the
decline of essences as credible trumps in the game of argumentationall of these have been portrayed as epistemological ravens, croaking
'Nevermore' over the corpse of reason." 9 Consequently, the dilemma
encountered by a concrete definition of local critique is that it attempts
local political activity, see infra notes 28-29 and accompanying text (discussing Duncan Kennedy's
proposal for local politics within a law firm), and the euphemistically titled CRrTCAL YOUNG PERSON'S
GUIDE TO CLS (unpublished manuscript), includes a discussion of work place politics. But there are
problems with trying to tie local critique too closely to CLS. Primarily, CLS people did not invent
local critique, and most of them are not arrogant enough to claim any exclusive hold on it. They
are merely some of the persons who engage in this genre of activity. Moreover, the CLS movement
has not been successfully defined. See Brest, Interpretation and Interest, 34 STAN. L. REv. 765
(1982) (describing CLS movement as "small and fragmented"); Boyle, supra note 2, at I (referring
to "the distinctly unplayful task of defining this mysterious animal [CLS]"); Note, Round and Round
the Bramble Bush: From Legal Realism to Critical Legal Scholarship, 95 HARV. L. REv. 1669,
1669 n.3 (1982) (describing CLS as lacking a "definitive methodological approach").
6. Boyle, The Politics of Reason: CriticalLegal Theory and Local Social Thought, 133 U. PA.
L. REv. 685, 715 (1985) [hereinafter cited as Boyle].
7. See D. HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE (1888).
8. See generally id.
9. Boyle, supra note 6, at 730. Because his article already provides a unique survey of the demise
of essences and reason, my essay only raises the issue briefly. The writer apologizes for the skeletal
treatment of a very complex body of "intellectual history." For a full analysis, the reader is recommended to D. BELL, THE CULTURAL CONTRADIcrTONS OF CAPrrALISM 45-84 (1976); M. BIDDIS,
THE AGE OF THE MASSES 315-56 (1977); Boyle, supra note 6, at 730-33 n.141.

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 16

to use reason to label different types of human interaction that can be
labeled in an infinite number of ways due to the subjective nature of
essences and dichotomies.
This dilemma can be exemplified by an analysis of a postulated dichotomy between local and "mainstream" political activity. By "mainstream," I mean what people commonly refer to as "political" practice:
"[o]f, pertaining to, or dealing with the study, structure, or affairs of
government, politics, or the state." 0 For example, pornography is commonly regarded as essentially a first amendment issue, a matter of mainstream political discourse. Rather than spending all of our time debating
about the constitutionality of pornography regulation, however, it might
be better to spend some of it attempting to publicize the harm to women
caused by pornography. In light of this harm, a group of individuals might
get together and hold a reading group to raise their consciousness of the
issue. In addition, the group might distribute circulars promoting their
cause in the local "adult theater" district. This kind of group activity
could be called local critique: it is inter-personal in character and seeks
to question an existing belief system. The focus of the group's method
is non-institutional (i.e. the group's members are not testifying before
the city's zoning board). But the association among the individuals of
the group" and the distribution of handbills' 2 also partake of the traditional
aspects of first amendment 13 protection. Thus, the group's activity can
be conceptualized in legal terms, the exercise of a constitutional right,
as well as a local critique.
Thus, a concrete dichotomy between "mainstream" and "local" activity dissolves in ordinary, daily affairs. Moreover, ideas about the "essential nature of a problem" obscure possible solutions such as those
taken by the anti-pornography group. Consequently, a categorized definition of local political activity that relies upon categories or essences
limits the diversity and significance of our thought processes much like
first amendment doctrine on the issue of pornography did not provide the
group with an alternative cosmology for addressing this harm. One Commentator notes:
Our use of the first amendment freedom of speech illustrates the
way in which language games and reification limit our conceptual
inquiries. . . .Should this concept really be the receptacle for dump10. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1015 (1976).
I1.See NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460-61 (1958) (discussing the
"close nexus between the freedoms of speech and assembly").
12. See Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
13. U.S. Const. amend. I (providing in part that "Congress shall make no law ... abridging
the freedom of speech ....").
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ing conflicts such as flag burning and pornography? Divisions erected
in our discourse allow us to announce that the First Amendment
protects certain activities and not others. Such divisions have the
same origins that allow us to distinguish between what a women
should do and not do, between politics and law, and between reason
and passion. In each case, the distinction has the appearance of
naturalness or common sense. But the lines drawn are the product
of arbitrary and unconscious political choices, not some concrete
grounding. 4
So what do I have to offer instead of a vision of political action that
is either exclusionary or essentialized? I will attempt to describe a vision
of everyday politics, a vision I will call local critique. The easiest way
to introduce what I am advocating is to say what I don't think. I don't
think that any action that doesn't involve the storming of the Winter
Palace is hopeless. I don't think that a law school, or anywhere else for
that matter, is "essentially co-opting," and I don't think it is impossible
to effect significant change in the lives of others. In other words, I think
that we can (and should) work on projects that focus on inter-personal
politics as well as, say, the arms race, that we have an opportunity to do
this kind of work in a law school and that we should go ahead and do it
without whining about co-optation, "revolution not reform," or any of
the other hypo-radical maxims that reduce to excuses for quietism. I hope
this essay provides a liberating theory, one that takes account of the preestablished hierarchies, institutions, and personal relationships in our
world, but does not "blindly force [our] understanding of concepts into
preconceived patterns by saying 'Yet this is how it has to be.'"
I. LOCAL POLITICAL ACTIVITY

Let me describe how the Introduction to Law class fits with what I've
been saying. In this section of the essay, I set out in more detail what I
mean by the term "local critique." In so doing, I explain why I have
chosen the term that I did. One possible explanation would involve a
Sisyphean task in lexicography. Another would involve an attempt to cut
through the Gordian knot of post-modernist social theory that is implicated
by the notion of local political activity. Instead, I propose three imprecise
characteristics of this sort of activity. Then, the meaning of this term is
clarified by a presentation of several examples of local political activity.
Naturally, this method of description is subject to a typical criticism of
14. Brainerd, The Groundless Assault: A Wittgensteinian Look at Languale. Structuralism, and
Critical Legal Theory, 34 AM. U.L. REv. 1231, 1237 (1985).
15. J. Gill, Wittgenstein and the Function of Philosophy, 2 Metaphilosophy 137, 139 (1971).
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critical legal theory, vagueness. 6 Upon completion of this section, however, the reader should be able to recognize local critique when she sees
it.
A. Introduction to Law: A Reified Description
A starting point for this inquiry is a description of what happened in
the Fall of 1984 at the University of New Mexico when Introduction to
Law was "taught" for the first time. I describe the course in terms of
three abstract essences or "reifications."" Naturally, one could find an
infinite number of "reified" ways to describe Introduction to Law, ranging
from an analysis of the ways that the furniture was arranged during the
discussion groups, to the male and female "voices""8 spoken during those
discussions. The description of the class along the lines that I propose,
however, is helpful for it allows one to recognize vastly different types
of political activity that, at least to some degree, square with the notion
of local critique. Once recognized, these particular abstractions are useful
for setting up a theory of political action.
Of the many ways that one could essentialize the characteristics of
Introduction to Law, three abstractions are important for the purposes of
this essay. First, there existed an emphasis upon the inter-personal experiences of the individuals who were involved in the project. Those
enrolled in the course wrote papers, conducted discussions, held parties,
and sang in small groups. Those "teaching" the course took steps to
obviate the hierarchy that is unnecessarily created by the labels of "student" and "professor." The "teachers" called themselves "non-teachers,"
renounced their authority, and exhibited vulnerability. In short, they acted
like human beings, and as a result, they interacted with students.
16. See Menand, Radicalism for Yuppies, NEW REPUBLIC, March 17, 1986, 20, 21 (stating that
CLS "offers only the fuzziest idea of what the good life might be and how it can be attained." Id.).
17. "Reification" is a term of art in critical legal theory. To "reify" is to excise an aspect of our
daily experience and abstract this experience into an essence. Thus abstracted, reification nullifies
experience as a constraint on the way one might manipulate the essence through argumentation. See
generally Boyle, Ideals and Things: International Legal Scholarship and the Prison-house of Lan-

guage, 26 HARv. INT'L L. J. 327, 328--30 (1985); Gabel, Reification in Legal Reasoning, 3 RESEARCH
IN LAW AND SOCIOLOGY 25, 26-28 (S. Spitzer ed. 1980).

Admittedly, this essay relies heavily upon the reification of Introduction to Law in particular and
political action in general. This reliance is not misplaced. The danger of reification lies in this: once
an aspect of experience is abstracted into an essence, one is easily lulled into accepting the essence
as a factual truth that is not to be questioned. See Gabel, supra. In contrast, reifying local critique
along the lines I propose does not so limit our freedom by closing visions of viable political action,
but emancipates us by constructing a theory that accounts for an expansive variety of political
activity. See infra notes 24-29 and accompanying text.
18. The concept of male and female voices is borrowed from C. GILLIGAN, INADIFFERENT VOICE:
PSYCHOLOGICAL THERAPY AND WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT (1982). For insightful reading on the topic
of a gendered approach to law school, see Frug, Rereading Contracts: A Feminist Analysis of a
Contracts Case Book, 34 AM. U.L. REV. 1065 (1985); Worden, supra note 1.
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Second, the course challenged the existing structure of legal education
by relying on methods which were alien to that medium. Throughout the
course, the attempt to challenge the objective cosmology of liberal legalism was conducted through discussion and song, not Socratic Method
and case briefing. As the course materials lambasted the standard law
school fare of apolitical conceptions of law, traditional methods of legal
pedagogy were challenged by the manner in which the course was conducted. Thus, one could describe the method of Introduction to Law, as
a reaction against the false necessities that are indoctrinated throughout
the rest of a law school experience.
Part of the way that the method of Introduction to Law challenged
legal education was that the stuff of the course took place at the "fringe"
of the institutional mechanism containing it, the University of New Mexico School of Law. As such, the students were listed at the Registrar's
Office and the teachers were paid with a check signed by the University's
Treasurer. Indeed, the discussions were even held at the University's
campus. This institutional structure, however, is aptly described as the
ephemeral background in which the course "really" took place-within
the discussion groups themselves.
Third, this description could not possibly ignore the law school setting
in which the course was conducted. There is no denying that Introduction
to Law was one feature within the medium of law school, an institution
which exerts its own political pressures. 9 Notwithstanding the liberating,
innovative, and emancipatory character of the course, it took place within
an environment which most assuredly had its hierarchical, oppressive,
and stultifying qualities, 2" as well as characteristics which allowed the
course to take place in the first place.
Throughout the rest of their tenure in law school, however, most all
the students of Introduction to Law will be forced to listen passively to
professors' seemingly apolitical ruminations on "transcendental nonsense"2
and attempt a metaphorical regurgitation on the pages of a Blue Book at
the end of each semester-the result being first-year mystification, secondyear boredom, and third-year burn out. The law school setting, consequently, was a great influence upon the course. Although Introduction to
Law was a laudable effort at transcending the law school setting by
19. KENNEDY, LEGAL EDUCATION AS TRAINING FOR HIERARCHY,
PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 40 (1983).

IN THE POLITICS OF LAW: A

20. Having never visited the University of New Mexico, I must qualify my statement. I describe
the UNM environment on the basis of my experiences with law schools generally. For examples of
those experiences put to paper, see Kennedy, supra note 19; Worden, supra note 1.
21. This term denotes legal concepts such as "[cJorporate entity, property rights, fair value, and
due process." Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV.
809, 820 (1035) (emphasis in original).

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 16

focusing on inter-personal group experience and utilizing a method foreign
to the law school setting, 22 its proponents cannot ignore its very medium.
B. Why the Term "Local Critique"?
Introduction to Law can be characterized as a political project that
directly assaulted many established preconceptions of legal education.
More specifically, the course consisted of an inter-personal effort that
attempted not to legitimize the very system it assaulted by utilizing methods of instruction that were foreign to accepted practice within law schools.
As such, the course can be described as a "local critique," a term borrowed from Michel Foucault to describe a type of theoretical project:
I would say, then, that what has emerged in the course of the last
ten or fifteen years is a sense of increasing vulnerability to criticism
of things, institutions, discourses. A certain fragility has been discovered in the bedrock of existence-even, and perhaps above all,
in those aspects of it that are most familiar, most solid and most
intimately related to our bodies and our everyday behavior.
• . . So the main point to be gleaned from these events of the last

fifteen years, their predominant feature, is the local character of the
criticism. That should not, I believe, be taken to mean that its qualities
are those of an obtuse, naive or primitive empiricism; nor is it a
soggy eclecticism, an opportunism that laps up any and every kind
of theoretical approach; nor does it mean a self-imposed ascetism
[sic] which taken by itself would reduce to the worst kind of theoretical impoverishment. I believe that what this essentially local
character of criticism indicates in reality is an autonomous noncentralized kind of theoretical production, one, that is to say, whose
validity is not dependent on the approval of the established regimes
of thought.23
The title of this essay derives from the three characteristics and the
22. This strategy for political action is based upon the notion that conducting political action
through existing institutional mechanisms reinforces legitmating ideologies, dominant institutions,
and hegemonic culture. See, e.g., Gabel & Kennedy, Roll Over Beethoven, 36 STAN. L. REv. 1,
33-34 (1984) (discussing legal rights); Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through An-

tidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine. 62 MINN. L. REv. 1049 (1978)
(discussing civil rights law); Klare, Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and the Origins of
Modern Legal Consciousness, 1937-1941, 62 MiNN. L. REv. 265 (1978) (discussing labor law).
23. M. FOUCAULT, PowER/KNOWLEWDGE 80-81 (1980) (emphasis in original).
I have limited the discussion of this essay to political actions taking place in particular localities
(e.g. a law school, an elevator, a shipyard, a P.T.A. meeting) and the discourse this activity generates.
Local critique is a similarly useful notion when examining large-scale, "global" social theories. For
a discussion of both varieties of local critique, see Boyle, supra note 6, at 773-78.
I use the term local critique to signify a method of group activity. Consequently, a number of
interchangeable phrases can be used: local political activity, a local project, local oppositional activity,

etc.
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tension between them. This sort of political activity is "local," because
it is "non-centralized" and, therefore, takes place in a variety of settings.
Introduction to Law was a project that occurred at one law school, not
legal education generally. But, from the description given in the paper
by Karl Johnson and Ann Scales, it seems as though the project impacted
greatly upon the "everyday behavior" of those involved. This is the first
characteristic I described-emphasizing the individual experience of those
involved in the project.
Whereas the Marxist professor might teach a "revolutionary" property
class in a very traditional way, Introduction to Law sought to destabilize
a system not only through the substance of the project, but particularly
by its method. The class was an end in itself, as well as a means to an
end. Thus, the class squared with the second standard characteristic of a
local critique in that it took place on the fringe of an institutional mechanism and conventional practice.
The class cannot be understood in isolation. It was in relation to, and
an implicit critique of, the rest of the participants' experience in legal
education. In so doing, those in Introduction to Law attempted not to
legitimize the medium constraining the project. Nevertheless, projects
such as Introduction to Law do occur within a dominant and constraining
medium. Of course, the project was inevitably affected to some degree
by what Foucault described as "accepted regimes of thought."
The immediate reaction of the hypo-radical to this third characteristic
of a local critique is to argue that the project will be co-opted. After all,
law schools, like leper colonies, are supposed to be "unclean" as regards
to "revolutionary purity." The hypo-radical purist might argue that the
course may not have changed legal education as much as it might have
merely made a fundamentally flawed program more bearable, and consequently giving it a veneer of legitimacy. She might note, for example,
the only reason that students co-taught the course was that they were
"empowered" to do so by their professors. For reasons that will become
clear later in the essay, I disagree.
C. The Variety of Local Critique
The following examples are included to aid in clarifying the meaning
of my use of Foucault's term and to illustrate the diversity of settings in
which local critique occurs. Instances of local oppositional activity abound
in the law school setting. A local critique is involved when a student
group writes a letter to the faculty asking them to hire more women or
minority professors, arranges a Sanctuary on campus, or circulates a
petition calling for the introduction of more public interest courses into
the curriculum. Another example is the "no hassle pass" movement at
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Harvard Law School during the 1982-83 academic year.24 This political
program consisted of an unstructured organization of students and professors who attempted through personal lobbying efforts to enact a school
policy allowing a student called upon in class to "pass" without being
hassled by the inquiring professor.' Over his embarrassed objections, I
also want to use as an example James Boyle's attempts to teach his torts
class in a way that would "demystify the [first-year doctrinal] subjects
that seemed to cause such psychic angst to first year students and that
set the stage for the disenchantment, apathy and boredom of the second
and third years. ,26
So far, I have commented on legal education. Local politicking is not
limited to "Langdellian" surroundings. One medium noted for local politics is the work place. Local mobilization can take place in a "sphere"
as seemingly public as a labor dispute or involve an apparently "private
sphere" concern such as increasing the number of women and minorities
on a university's faculty. 27 One scenario of work place politics is the
corporate law firm, a place where a lawyer can subtly "resist illegitimate
hierarchy and alienation "21 in such a way that she can "be able to do left
office politics without being fired, and make partner." 29 From what has
been said, local oppositional activity can also take place in the most
monolithic of institutions, the workings of government,3" insofar as it
somewhat coincides with the three enunciated characteristics: action focusing on interpersonal experience that consists of a method foreign to
the medium that is challenged.
Up until now, I have been trying to expand the potential number of
ways of thinking about political action without betraying my project by
conceptualizing it. 3 Consequently, I have proposed a purposely vague
definition of local critique so as to dissuade the reader from adopting a
"cook book" approach to political action that focuses on a "recipe" of
three necessary ingredients-"I need a dash of structure transcendence
with a dab of marginal activity, and a pinch of interpersonal experience."
I will confess that I may have reified and manipulated the stuff of Intro24. See Gabel & Kennedy, supra note 22, at 55.
25. See id.; see also 1. BOYLE, CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES:A YOUNG PERSON'S GUIDE 18 (1984)

(unpublished) (discussing strategy to politicise an anti-nuclear campaign within a law school).
26. Boyle, Anatomy of a Torts Class, 34 AM. U.L. REV. 1003-05 (1985).
27. See Boyle, supra note 25, at 18. The concepts of public and private spheres are developed
in Kennedy, The Stages of the Decline of the Public/PrivateDistinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1349

(1982).
28. Kennedy, Rebels From Principle:Changing the Corporate Law Firm from Within. 33 HARV.
L. SCH. BULL. 36, 38 (fall 1981).
29. Id., at 40.
30. See generally Simon, The Ideology ofAdvocacy: Procedural Justice and Professional Ethics,

1978 Wts. L. REV. 29 (1978).
31. See Gabel & Kennedy, supra note 22, at 1.
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duction to Law. I did so, however, with the purpose of accomplishing
the "concrete task of writing things that evoke successful moments of
struggle, to realize, in direct relations, what good possibilities there are
in life." 3 2
So far, I have argued that Introduction to Law can usefully be seen as
an example of local critique, and I have tried to indicate why someone
might want to engage in this sort of activity. I have talked about the
decline of large-scale social theories, historical objectivity, and neutral
essences. I have also talked about how people often experience the exercise of power in a way that does not fit with a standard conception of
politics. These realizations, which signify how the common conception
of political activity does not always square with the fine texture of social
interaction, might lead one to engage in a local critique such as Introduction to Law.
I have argued that someone, not only can, but should engage in political
action on the fringes of established institutions. I do not mean to denigrate
institutions as mechanisms for social change, but to reveal that these
mechanisms have an internal reality, in which people work and interact,
as well as in the external reality that we read about in constitutions,
political philosophies, and committee reports. As a result, the essay advocates that we expand our ways of thinking about political action.
In addition, this essay takes account of what people experience in
institutions in general and in law school in particular. First, this essay
reveals that one can mount local oppositions because of the "open" texture
of legal education. Law school is not a Gulag. It is full of genuinely
concerned people who want to make the place better and the education
more relevant, as well as those who are formalistic martinets. Second,
it is a good idea to engage in actions on the fringe of the law school
mechanism. Indeed, it is valid to mount an action that makes sense only
with reference to some existing construct. As such, Introduction to Law
was both a critique and a utopian proposal. It is true that the course would
have little or no meaning taken out of the law school context, for it is
not a plan for the remaking of society. But, it worked at what it set out
to accomplish within its own specific context. Third, the project was
carried out without being co-opted. This is because the idea of "the
structure" is just as much a reification when it is used to justify radical
inaction as to justify a formalist judicial decision. In contrast, the local
critique is a project that challenges existing constraints in method and
substance. In short, the participants in a local project act out their opposition to the constraining and focus upon their experiences in doing
so.
32. Id., at 3.
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II. THE 'FANCY' THEORY UNDERLYING A THEORY OF
LOCAL CRITIQUE
In the second section of the essay, I want to describe four intellectual
precursors to local critique, two of which concentrate on the possibilities
for personal action and two of which give some texture to our understanding of the constraints of our abilities to act. My aim, in short, is to
be a kind of research assistant to someone who was in the same position
as those involved in Introduction to Law. Such a person might want to
know what fancy theory could tell her about the constraints of accepted
practice within the law school setting-the way that classroom design
fits in with black letter teaching, as well as the topics of discussion that
deans, students, or professors will automatically consider to be "matters
of law" or "matters of politics" without examining their decision. In
addition, she will want to have some framework for thinking about, or
circumventing, all of this stuff-of making the impossible possible, of
taking responsibility for one's actions or inaction.
In this section, I attempt to provide such a guide. First, I describe, in
brutally truncated fashion, the ways in which existentialism and phenomenology might help a person in the position I described. Then, I describe
the work of Wittgenstein and Gramsci in a similarly abridged manner. I
do so to reveal how notions called "the form of life" and "hegemony"
explain how one might think about the constraints and methodological
difficulties that are faced by any effort at local critique.
A. The Phenomenologicaland ExistentialApproaches to Local
Critique
Due to the demise of essences and a priori truths that were postulated
in the first part of the essay,33 the discourse of humankind could be viewed
as a morass of political arguments." Consequently, the power of our
rationality was placed in doubt. As a result, one of the tasks of modern
philosophy was to restore a sense of value in ourselves, although it was
an admittedly subjective task.35 Two of the manifestations of this endeavor
that are important for the purposes of this essay are phenomenology and
existentialism.36 These two visions embrace the principle that worthwhile
theoretical inquiries examine the subjective thoughts and experiences of
33. See supra notes 6-9 and accompanying text.
34. See generally Boyle, supra note 6.
35. See H. PrmN, WrrrGErsTEIN AND JusTICE 218 (1972).
36. This essay uses these two terms with the understanding that they do not connote two separate
modes of analysis. Indeed, the analyses frequently overlap. See, e.g., Gabel, supra note 17 (discussing reification in terms of Sartrean phenomenology and existentialism). The author intends only
to briefly survey this complicated and weighty body of thought and apologizes for any distortion in
so doing.
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an individual. Each of these theories provide ample support for local
critique.
Phenomenology is the study of one's knowledge of occurrences or
"phenomena." 3 7 As such, phenomenology is an attempt at directing the
focus of philosophical inquiry from the seemingly distant realm of on3
tology or metaphysics to one's immediate experience. " Under basic tenets
of phenomenological thought, an individual must examine her reactions
to her perceptions and not be constrained by presuppositions that would
lull her into reinterpreting her experiences so that they fit neatly into a
39
picture that is dictated by social conventions. By doing so, a phenomenological approach allows one to discover possibilities for acting that
unexamined social conventions have foreclosed.' Thus, phenomenology
exalts the notion of an autonomous, subjective self; through introspection
of experience, one can act ever more autonomously and consequently
perceive new experiences that set the groundwork for even more freedom.
It should be apparent from this brief survey that phenomenology introduces powerful conceptions of the attainment of freedom that buttress
a theory of local critique. Primarily, both local critique and phenomen4
ology emphasize the experience of an individual subject. ' In addition,
the local and phenomenological projects both cultivate the freedom of its
participants by experimenting with activity that is not yet prescribed by
the social conventions of a particular context. As noted, local critique
challenges the existing order by utilizing methods that are foreign to the
accepted practice of the existing structure.42 Through these actions, one
realizes that she need not act in the conventional manner. The liberating
aphorism of phenomenology became the precise lesson of Introduction
to Law: my law school experience can be better than the conventional
law school career, if I make it so.
The second vision, the existentialist, similarly gives primacy to the
value of the subjective self. This tendency in our discourse was foru43
mulated succinctly by Jean Paul Sartre: "Existence precedes essence."
With no essences to rely upon, one has the almost overwhelming responsibility of determining how to conceive of oneself and the immediate
37. See generally F. Dallmayr, Beyond Dogma and Despair, 97-98 (1981) (setting forth basic
development of phenomenological inquiry); Boyle, supra note 6, at 741-42 n. 164 (same).
38. Edmund Husserl is generally credited with a germinative influence in phenomenological
inquiry. See E. HusSERL, IDEAS: A GENERAL INTRODUCTION TO PURE PHENOMENOLOGY (1982).
39. See I. M. MERLEAu-PoNTY, THE VISIBLE AND THE INVISIBLE (1968).
40. See A. ScHurz, THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL WORLD (1967).
41. See supra text following note 18 (setting forth individual experience as the first characteristic
of local critique).
42. See id. (setting forth local critique's second characterization as utilizing a method uncommon
to the challenged structure).
43. J. SARTRE, ESSAYS N ExISTENALISM 35-36 (1965).
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stage of world history." Consequently, introspection upon the daily texture of social interaction is the existentialist framework in which an
45
individual decides issues of morality.
Existentialism serves local critique well. It supports the effort of a local
project to construct a new reality within an existing medium. Because
the emphasis of a local critique is the experience of its members,46 the
actual method of a local critique sets a groundwork in which project
members directly observe the outcome of moral dilemmas that accompany
political conflict among persons. These experiences are intense. Those
involved in a local project deal with real people in an actual struggle,
not merely the filing of a motion or the casting of a ballot. They see the
results of their efforts immediately, in others and themselves. The snippets
from student journals provided by Karl and Ann make clear that Introduction to Law possessed all of these characteristics. In sum, the emphasis
of the local critique on personal experience enlarges the potential for
cultivating the freedom of its members by directly exposing them to actual
moral dilemmas.
B. Wittgenstein's and Gramsci's Approach To Local Critique
But the very commentaries on the transcendence of constraint that make
phenomenology and existentialism so attractive, also raise the issue of
how one is to view the medium or "structure" in which action takes
place. Consequently, the third characteristic of local critique,47 which the
discussion of phenomenology and existentialism did not address, is raised.
Without the aid of an overarching a priori truth that says otherwise, one
cannot deny the effects not only of the immediate medium of the local
project, but the much broader structures such as language and understanding. Unfortunately, such a truth is not available.48 What do we do?
This part of the essay provides two complimentary ways of addressing
this issue, derived from the work of Ludwig Wittgenstein and Antonio
Gramsci.
Ludwig Wittgenstein's analysis of language is important to a theory
of local political action, because it provides insights on how one can be
able to act autonomously within a structure.49 Wittgenstein attempted to
44. See generally J. SARTRE, CRITIQUE OF DIALECTICAL REASON (Sheridan-Smith trans. 1982).
HEIDEGGER AND SARTRE 1-30 (1979); M. HEIDEGGER, THE BASIC PROBLEMS OF
PHENOMENOLOGY (A. Hofstedter trans. 1982).

45. See J. FELL,

46. See supra text following note 18 (setting forth emphasis upon individual experience as the
first characteristic of local critique).
47. See supra text following note 18 (setting forth existence of local project as third characteristic
of local critique).
48. See supra notes 6-9 and accompanying text.
49. This section deservedly begins with a caveat. Wittgenstein never addressed the topic of political
action. In fact, he did not directly address political theory or even the subjectivist/structuralist tension.
This section of the essay is based in large part upon the observations of Brainerd, supra note 14,
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expose the unconscious assumptions in our discourse-our "form of
life"-so that one could realize the culturally accepted "givens" that
influence our perception. 50
Wittgenstein's analysis of structure is based upon the meaning of words
within language. His thesis is that a word can only have meaning when
it is placed within the entire context of an all-encompassing and interrelated linguistic framework. Simply put, "the meaning of a word is its
use in language."'" Generally, this potentially tautological statement is
of great importance if one considers that knowledge of the entire language
structure, and consequently the meaning of a single word, necessitates
that the listener possesses a very complex set of understandings to decode
the linguistic framework. 2 Compare this idea to your experience of the
complex set of "understandings" that one gains from legal education in
order to make sense of legal jargon and you will see the importance of
Wittgenstein to a discussion of Introduction to Law.
An understanding of the linguistic framework is significant when one
realizes that the way that people live their lives is intertwined with the
language they use.53 Hence, "to imagine a language means to imagine a
form of life." '5 4 Wittgenstein's observations have more critical "bite"
than a simple reminder that those living in Antartica have more words
for the conception of a "snowflake" than those living in Florida. He
shows us that an examination of the language structure can reveal aspects
of life that people consider to be doubtful or certain. Our language, our
"form of life," embody the certainties that are admitted by everyone in
a given social context.55 Without any debate, "human beings . . . agree
they use. That is not agreement in opinions, but in form
in the language
'5 6
life.
of
Wittgenstein's reasoning can be clarified by an example of the hushed
muttering that one can usually hear each September outside the lecture
halls in which the doctrinal courses are taught to first-year law students.
an extrapolation of the tension between subjectivism and structuralism found in Wittgenstein's
linguistic theory. I, in turn, apply this extrapolation to local critique. What follows, therefore, is an
extrapolation upon an extrapolation. The reader deserves to be warned that I am taking certain
liberties with Wittgenstein's work by describing what he would have thought about political action.
50. In a sense, Wittgenstein's "form of life" in his examination of language parallels Foucault's
notion of "epistemes," the unexamined social justifications that exist within a given historical context.
See M. FOUCAULT, THE ORDER OF THINGS: AN ARCHEOLOGY OF THE HUMAN SCIENCES 250-94 (1973);
See also Aron, Wittgenstein's Impact on Foucault, in WITTGENSTEIN AND His IMPACT ON CONTEMPORARY
THOUGHT 58-60 (1977) (discussing similarities in work of Foucault and Wittgenstein); Brainerd,
supra note 14, at 1251.
51. L.WlTrGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS at 43 (3d ed. 1968).
52. See id. at § 30 ("So one might say: the ostensive definition explains the use--the meaningof the word when the overall role of the word in language is clear").
53. See id. at § 23 ("speaking of language is part of... a form of life") (emphasis in original).
54. Id. at § 19.
55. See id. at § 241.
56. Id.(emphasis added).
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One cannot help but overhear the agonized grumblings about "briefing
cases." This phrase, or words to that effect, denote the activity that most
of the students have been doing all afternoon in the library and well into
the night. In a strange sense, therefore, the briefing of cases constitutes
one aspect of a form of life for many first-year students. The clamor,
however, generally does not include any discussion of whether this activity is worthwhile (at least for the first part of the semester, unless a
student has learned that the second and third years never brief their reading
assignments). All the talk about whether one's brief captured the "crucial"
issue, rule, or policy argument of the assigned case indicates an implicit
and unexamined agreement on the part of the students that briefing cases
is a worthwhile way to spend one's evening.
Given Wittgenstein's proposition that everything takes place in the
form of life, an all-encompassing structure of interrelated parts, what is
the proper object of a philosophical inquiry? Wittgenstein's answer is
based upon the premise of this essay; to wit: that there exist no essences
or a priori truths. His answer is that we should examine the texture of
our form of life, "not by giving new information, but by arranging what
we have always known." 57 Upon this examination, one does not find an
essence running throughout our language, because, as previously noted,58
any word can be defined by virtue of its relation to the entirety of the
linguistic framework.5 9 As a result, this examination merely illuminates
an interrelated network of "similarities, relationships, and a whole series
with them at that."' Similarly, the encompassing contextuality of our
form of life does not allow us to permit one to look beyond our experiential
framework to determine an objective truth, 6' although we incorrectly
attempt to do so to order the complexities of our form of life.6 2 Any
notion of an overarching truth is faulty because it cannot be described
by reference to the characteristics of our form of life.
Without having access to an objective criteria from outside the form
of life or an essence derived from its constituent parts, we are forced to
accept our form of life as a structure that is completely arbitrary. In
addition, it follows from Wittgenstein's analysis that one can only judge
the truth or falsity of a physical phenomenon or mental construct by
comparing it to the arbitrarily constructed background of one's form of
57. Id. at § 109.
58. See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
59. See Wittgenstein, supra note 51, at § 67.
60. Id. at § 66.
61. See id. at § 109.
62. See Gill, supra note 15 (describing Wittgenstein's thought as an attempt to prevent the
overextension of language by dissuading one's attempt to derive principles from outside the linguistic
framework).
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To proclaim that a proposition is either true or false, therefore,
4 in
reference to the form of life. Such an all encompassing context cannot
be challenged from outside the framework of the form of life, because
consequently,
everything takes place within it. To Wittgenstein,
'"65
admits.
everyone
what
states
only
"[p]hilosophy
From the above description of the form of life, it appears that the
Wittgensteinian approach to constraining structures is demobilizing, because one cannot transcend one's medium. This conclusion is erroneous
if one considers, as Wittgenstein did, that the arbitrary framework of
beliefs constituting the form of life must contain some assumptions that
ground.' These assumptions
enable the structure to actually get off the
6
7
are aptly called "enabling propositions. , Enabling propositions consist
of pre-logical decisions that are as arbitrary as the form of life itself.
The notion of enabling propositions permits one to consider the notion
of an autonomous local critique within the structure of the form of life.
Wittgenstein never claims that these assumptions cannot be challenged,
only that they are conventionally left unexamined. He simply asserts that
philosophy cannot rely upon essences or justifications from outside the
form of life to challenge the status quo. To challenge enabling propositions
by doubting what others normally do not, however, is to challenge the
form of life from within.
Wittgenstein's argument can be clarified by referring back to the example of the neophyte law students who were discussing the burdens of
case briefing. As noted, their discussions assumed the value of spending
their time conducting this activity. After a semester or two of law school,
many will probably realize that the assumptions that justified this activity-that briefing cases would help them understand "the law," be prepared for class, or excel on exams-simply were not defensible in their
experience. In a sense, the justifications for case briefing can be viewed
as enabling propositions. As the previous discussions of students signified
that these assumptions were not examined aspects of their form of life,
their decision to stop briefing cases reflected their examination of their
form of life. Significantly, the experience of the students, not reified
essences, exploded the myths that justified the long hours spent writing
upon a legal pad.
The implications of the Wittgensteinian brand of structuralism for polife. 63

"only means that it must be possible to decide for or against it,''

63. See L. WITrGENSTEIN, ON CERTAINTY § 94 (1972).
64. Id. at § 200.
65. Wittgenstein, supra note 51, at § 599.
66. See Wittgenstein, supra note 63, at § 150 (stating "somewhere I must begin with not-doubting;
that is not, so to speak, hasty but excusable: it is a part of judging").
67. See Bogen, Wittgenstein and Skepticism, 83 PHILOSOPHICAL REV. 364 (1974).
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litical action can be clarified by a comparison to the work of Antonio
Gramsci. 68 Gramsci's comparative analysis of the cultures of Western
Europe and the Soviet Union led him to conclude that "hegemony"
allowed the wealthy capitalist classes to remain in power and oppress the
unwitting proletariat without resorting to physical force.69 For the purposes of this essay, the relevant aspect of his theory is the notion of
hegemony. Hegemony subtly coerced the lower classes to consent to their
low position within the social stratification:
By hegemony Gramsci meant the permeation throughout civil society-including a whole range of structures and activities like trade
unions, schools, the churches, and the family-of an entire system
of values, attitudes, beliefs, morality, etc. that is in one way or
another supportive of the established order and the class interests
that dominate it....
To the extent that this prevailing consciousness
is internalized by the broad masses, it becomes part of "common
sense. "70
This description of hegemony sounds very similar to Wittgenstein's
notion of the form of life. Both conceptions embody the values and
perceptions that run throughout the social world. In addition, both theorists believe that the existing structures can be changed through political
action. The difference between the thought of Wittgenstein and Gramsci
is that Gramsci transcends the structure to determine the cause of the
topography of the existing structure, a conspiracy of capitalists. In contradistinction, Wittgenstein would find Gramsci's attempt to derive this
causal principle from beyond the form of life an overextension of philosophy.
Because a local critique challenges enabling propositions from within
the form of life, such an inquiry is not an overextension of philosophy.
This type of a challenge must be distinguished from extending our knowledge beyond the form of life to derive an animating principle for change.
A realizable challenge against our structure is only made by altering our
form of life from within. Thus, Wittgenstein's analysis leads one to
conclude that once one has decided to become mobilized, the way to
conduct political activity is in the experiential manner of local critique
that emphasizes a method that is a variation of the conventional practice.
He states: "The sickness of time" is cured only "by an alteration of the
68. See generally A. GRAMSCI, SELECTIONS FROM THE PRISON NOTEBOOKS (Q. Hore & G. NowellSmith eds. 1971); GREER, ANTONIO GRAMSCI AND "LEGAL HEGEMONY" IN THE
POLITICS OF LAW,
supra note 19, at 304.
69. See Gramsci, supra note 68, at 171.
70. C. BOGGS, GRAMSCI'S MARXISM 39-40 (1976).
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mode of life of human beings" through alternative methods of "thought
and of life, not through the medicine invented by an individual."'" In
terms of local critique, the local project's method that is foreign to the
challenged institutional medium, but not our form of life, consists of the
requisite variation of existing conventional practices to permit social change
without overextending our capabilities of reason.
In a sense, Introduction to Law thematised the "normal" structure of
law school as Wittgenstein thematised the conventional usage of words
in a language. By conducting a class that was different from conventional
law school practice, those involved in Introduction to Law exposed many
of the implicit assumptions that support the conventional "themes" of
law school-that only a professor teaches the class, that classes are conducted beneath a veneer of political neutrality, that philosophy or emotions
do not belong in the discussion, etc. What is more, Introduction to Law
did not go outside the form of life to achieve this goal. The voices spoken
during the discussion groups existed among first-year law students all the
while. In Introduction to Law, however, these voices were not suppressed
by the Canute-like method of Socratic "discussion." Similarly, the method
of the class, although foreign to the law school setting, was not outside
the context of the participant's past experience, but merely a new application of it. It is likely that those involved in the course were enrolled
in similar courses in undergraduate school or during graduate study in a
discipline other than law. For example, a graduate student in philosophy
reacted to Karl and Ann's paper by telling me "I don't know what all
the fuss is about. The method of Introduction to Law is not completely
new. "
An awareness of the structural element of local critique is useful for
it takes account of the medium in which the project operates. Local
critique makes no naive assumptions about the limiting effects of social
convention,72 even on the local projects that take place on the seemingly
extreme fringes of an institutional mechanism. The local project, however,
in attempting to transcend established practice by utilizing an unconventional method, is a political project that remains vigilant of the limiting
effect of structure. This is true whether the structure is as immediate as
an educational institution or as amorphous as language. Moreover, by
embracing a method that is foreign to the challenged mechanism, a local
71. L. WITrGENSTEIN, REMARKS ON THE FOUNDATIONS OF MATHEMATICS 132 (1974).
72. The notion that the conventional vision of politics limits possibilities for actual practice is
not new. See G. Lukacs, Reification and the Consciousness of the Proletariat,in HISTORY AND CLASS
CONSCIOUSNESS: STUDIES IN MARXIST DIALECTICS 103 (1977) (discussing the obscuring effects of
reification on the conventional vision of the contingency of politics); K. MANNHEIM, IDEOLOGY AND
UTPIA (L. Wirth & E. Shils eds. 1936) (description of limiting effects of cultural convention on

the manner one views the social world).
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critique is a working project that actually alters broad, amorphous structures of beliefs in particular areas.
III. SYNTHESIS OF THE THEORIES IN LOCAL CRITIQUE
We have looked at the phenomenological and existential emphasis on
the individual on the one hand and Wittgenstein's and Gramsci's analysis
of medium on the other. I think that there is a way of putting these two
sets of ideas together. Of course, there is no point of essential balance
between, for example, Sartre and Gramsci. There is, however, a way of
putting the ideas together in practice, of using them in a manner that
seems to fit with the generally iconoclastic method I have been describing."

Local critique does not defer or sublimate the tension between these
two sets of ideas, by privileging one tendency over the other. For example,
this theory of local critique does not propose that these theories exist
harmoniously by asserting that the principles of existentialism provide
the animating force of the local project and the arbitrary nature of our
structure, as described by Wittgenstein, permits the people involved in
the project to act autonomously. Such a postulation, by erroneously deriving the animating principle from beyond the form of life, portrays
existentialism as a foundation of our ideas. " This is an emphasis that
appeals to one's modernist disposition, but only at the cost of ultimately
relying on existentialism as an a priori truth.
The notion of local critique set forth in this essay, moreover, does not
synthesize the characteristics of these theories by taking an aspect of
73. As already noted, see supra note 23, James Boyle has observed that the notion of local
critique relates to large-scale and small-scale theories. He bases his analysis on two conflicting
tendencies in our discourse, an emphasis on the individual's ability to act autonomously and an
emphasis on the constraints that might keep her from doing so. He labels these tendencies the
"subjectivist" and the "structuralist" strands respectively. In relation to the themes
in this essay,
these tendencies correlate roughly with the phenomenological and existential approaches to autonomy
that are in tension with Wittgenstein's and Gramsci's approaches to structuralism. For his insightful
survey of the subjectivist and structuralist tendencies running throughout critical legal theory and
the survey of the "politics of reason" that spawned this antinomy, see generally id. For a description
of the terms subjectivism and structuralism as well as the tension that exists between them, see id.
at 740-41.
In fact, James Boyle takes on a much more ambitious endeavor than the description of local
political action. He sets forth how the tension between the two strands is useful in "doing" social
theory. See generally, id.; see also Gabel, Intention and Structure in Contractual Conditions: Outline
of a Method for Legal Theory, 61 MINN. L. REV. 601, 602 (1977) (describing a similar tension as
being central to critical legal theory).
I am deeply indebted to him for the insights that he has provided in his article. They were formative
influences upon my essay.
74. For an example of a theory that synthesizes subjectivism and structuralism by giving the
former a postion of ascendancy over the latter, see GORDEN, NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN LEGAL THEORY,

IN POLMCS OF LAW, supra note II, at 281, 287 (while noting the effect of structure, asserting
"'social reality' is something that we ourselves are constantly constructing"); see also Boyle, supra
note 6, at 724-25, 763-64, 773.
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social life and reifying it in such a manner that the conflicting theories
are frozen during a conceptual moment of harmony. James Boyle points
out that Roberto Unger's insightful critique of liberalism, Knowledge and
Politics,75 reifies the "deep structure" of liberalism in order to freeze it
so as to reveal the incoherency of its structure. 6 Although not all reifications foreclose alternatives of action, the realm of an essentialized
theory of state is distant from the full and fine texture of social interaction
77
where the members of a local critique experience moral dilemma.
In contrast, the notion of local critique described in this essay is that
of a project that takes place in the context of very concrete moral dilemma,
personal interaction, and political struggle. This is a medium that is at
once intense and tedious, sometimes elating and frequently dismal. Consequently, the local critique, having no opportunity to defer or reify the
existing tension, must confront it. This confrontation is narrow in scope,
existing within the direct experience of those engaged in the project. This
characteristic of local critique makes for its efficacy at changing the form
of life. Where the project takes place, its effects are cogent. Because the
scope of a local critique is limited to the immediate group effort, the
project need not contend with as many epistomological worries about
prioritizing subjective theories as a large scale project or a global theory.
Consequently, it is less likely that those involved in the project will be
forced to privilege one subjective vision over another.
The four theories that I have discussed intersect in the daily workings
of a local critique. By experimenting with elements of the structure, the
local project cultivates the autonomy of the members of the project. In
so doing, the project develops a practice which harmonizes theory about
constraint and about transcendence. The ideas work symbiotically. The
result of the project's working experimentation with the assumptions of
the form of life is a vision of autonomy that in turn cultivates more interest
in challenging other assumptions of the structure. If the experiment proves
to be a failure, new avenues for additional trial and error may be exposed.
If not, the individuals taking part in the local critique have not learned
the futility of their project, but merely the adamancy of the beliefs that
buttress conventional practice notwithstanding its groundlessness."
CONCLUSION
In this essay, I intended to shed some light on an infrequently discussed
and much misunderstood genre of political action. I argued that there are
75. See R. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLMCS (1971).
76. See Boyle, supra note 6, at 713-15, 757-60.
77. Id. at 756-60.
78. An analysis of local theory along these lines is found at Boyle, supra note 6, at 746-48,
760; Brainerd, supra note 37 at 1261.
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many more forms of politics than are contained in our large-scale philosophies. Courses like Introduction to Law can be seen as examples of
"local critique." They are marginal, but effective. They are as much
process as substance, and those involved in the local project do not spend
their time agonizing over co-optation, scientific theories, or neutral principles. I am not saying that we should spend all of our moral energy
reshaping the accepted conception of "the political arena." I am saying
that law schools are another setting for struggle and community, and that
local critique is one way of thinking about struggle and community in
and outside of law school.
A theory of local critique is eminently liberating. It provides a method
for the realization of a plethora of political actions that "common sense"
might dictate as being nonsensical. It exposes alternatives in a massive
and alienating society for political action so that subjugated voices might
be heard or an intolerable lifestyle eased. Throughout the course of this
essay, I surveyed richly dense and deeply constructive visions of the
social world. Accordingly, I hoped to render inapposite, if not absurd, a
recent commentator's assertion that "the law school graduate who sets
up shop in the real world on Critical Legal principles will not only find
himself unable to practice much law; he will find himself unable-for
good or ill-to practice much politics either." 79 Thus, the embodiment
of these theories in the form of local critique, makes this brand of activity
a worthwhile form of action.
In short, local critique fulfills what has been claimed to be the task of
all philosophy: "liberate us from illusions about (our] conceptual system,
from fragments of earlier philosophers [that have] become empty slogans
of interpretation, from evasions and hypocracies, from distortions and
misunderstandings. "'o

79. Menand, supra note 8, at 23.
80. H. Pitkin, supra note 35, at 298 (1972).

